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Comments
The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment:
Under What Circumstances Does It Exist?
I. INTRODUCTION
Today it is a common occurrence in a hospital for patients who re-
quire medical treatment to refuse such necessary care even if it
results in their death.' Their reasons are usually grounded upon
religious convictions, but also may be grounded upon their desire to
avoid further medical procedure and the accompanying drudgery of
life.! Physicians, as well as the entire hospital staff, are uncertain of
how to deal with the legal and moral problems this situation presents.
Legally, the doctors may be subjected to law suits for acting negligent-
ly, for not acting at all, or alternatively, for acting without proper
authorization. Morally,' the physician, who is effectively prevented
from treating the sick, is acting in conflict with his conscience and
medical training as exemplified by the Hippocratic Oath.' Ostensibly,
then, doctors may literally be "damned if they do and damned if they
don't" when they fail to comply with the patient's desire to refuse
medical treatment.
The legal issues involving refusal of medical treatment revolve
around the precept that a doctor may only administer treatment when
1. See Note, The Dying Patient.- A Qualified Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 7
J. FAM. L. 644 (1967), which noted the rise in the number of refusal cases in 1967. That
this dilemma has become more prevalent since 1967 will be outlined in this comment.
2. For an example of a refusal based upon religious grounds, see Aste v. Brooks, 32
Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (because of her religious conscience, the patient repeated-
ly informed the physician, who was treating her for a peptic ulcer, that she was not per-
mitted to receive blood transfusions).
3. For a general discussion of the moral issue, see Wassmer, Between Life and
Death. Ethical and Moral Issues Involved in Recent Medical Advances, 13 VILL. L. REV.
759 (1968).
4. The relevant part of the oath of Hippocrates reads as follows:
I will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according to my ability and my
judgment and never do harm to anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a deadly
drug, nor give advice which may cause his death. Nor will I give a woman a
pessary to procure abortion. But I will preserve the purity of my life and my art. I
will not cut for stone, even for patients in whom the disease is manifest; I will leave
this operation to be performed by practitioners (specialists in this art). In every
house where I come I will enter only for the good of my patients, keeping myself
far from all intentional ill-doing and all seduction, and especially from the pleasures
of love with women or with men, be they free or slaves.
J. STEDMAN, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 647 (23rd ed. 1976).
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the patient has given his informed consent; otherwise, the physician
may be subjected to legal action for malpractice in failing to obtain
proper authorization. 5 An "informed consent" is an agreement between
the doctor and patient whereby the patient grants his permission to
allow the hospital staff to proceed with a specific method of treatment.
State statutes and judicial rulings specify that before a patient signs
an informed consent form he must be apprised of the nature of the pro-
posed procedure, the associated risks, and of the possible alternatives
to the treatment.' Therefore, where a patient refuses medical treat-
ment and has not given his informed consent, a doctor cannot legally
proceed.
Moreover, the option of refusing medical treatment exposes a more
serious legal problem where the patient's choice may result in his
death. Since there is an absence of strong judicial direction in the area,
the law is unclear as to whether a patient may terminate his own life
by refusing medical care. The United States Supreme Court has not
specifically addressed the issue of a patient's right to refuse medical
treatment and the lower state and federal courts that have considered
the issue have not been consistent in their decisions. This judicial
uncertainty is perhaps prompted by the recognition that another fun-
damental right, the right to die, may also be involved. If the doctor
cannot legally proceed without the patient's informed consent, and the
prognosis without treatment is death, then by permitting the patient
to refuse treatment, there is an implicit recognition of the right to
die-a right which has not yet achieved total and uncontroverted
judicial acceptance. Yet, where the right has been recognized, it has
been premised upon the all-encompassing right to privacy.7 The
5. A doctor may be sued in tort for a battery absent consent, for if he continues
with a procedure, an unauthorized touching of the patient's body occurs. W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 1971). The physician could also be held liable under a theory of
negligent malpractice for violation of the duty to provide sufficient information to the pa-
tient so as to permit him to make a proper evaluation. Nonetheless, the patient must
prove that he would not have submitted to the treatment if sufficient information had
been provided and that the treatment or lack thereof proximately caused his injury.
Canterbury v. Spence 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
6. See generally 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.103 (Purdon Supp. 1979); Dunham
v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1970).
7. The right to privacy finds its roots in a series of Supreme Court decisions that
established the right of privacy not as an enumerated right, but rather, as one within the
penumbra of the fundamental rights. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (expanded
right to privacy to encompass a woman's right to determine if she wants an abortion dur-
ing the first trimester of pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (first
decision to recognize the penumbra of rights theory). The expansive view of the right to
privacy has been tempered somewhat by later decisions. See, e.g., Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affrd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)
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privacy issue is important because the right to self-determination can
arguably be extrapolated from it. The concept of self-determination is
certainly not a new concept. As far back as 1914, Justice Cardozo ex-
pressed the opinion that every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body."'
This right to privacy is, however, not absolute, and the extent of its
limits remains open for interpretation; although the privacy right may
arguably include the right to die, this issue also remains an open one.
Thus, because the right to die question has not been resolved, the
courts find difficulty in dealing with situations involving an individual's
refusal of medical treatment.
This comment examines approaches which courts have taken in
handling the legal ramifications of a recognition of a patient's right to
refuse medical treatment. A review of the relevant compulsory medical
treatment cases reveals that only under very special circumstances
will the courts allow a patient to refuse treatment when that refusal
will result in his ultimate demise. Moreover, these decisions indicate
that courts have adhered to certain criteria when considering a pa-
tient's right to refuse treatment. In delineating the relevant criteria,
courts have essentially focused upon the character of the patient in-
volved, as well as upon the factual setting in which the right to refuse
medical treatment is asserted. Specifically, the three patient categories
include minors, competent adults, and incompetent adults. The two
broad categories pertaining to factual settings involve emergency
situations and nonemergency situations.' By categorizing cases in such
(Virginia's statute limiting homosexual activity held not to be violative of the right to
privacy).
8. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 126, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
9. The framework for the analysis in this comment can be best explained by the
following chart:
Factual Setting
Patient Urgent Emergency Nonurgent Emergency Nonemergency
Minor A B B
Competent Adult A C C
Incompetent Adult A D D
KEY
A - The patient can be treated without his consent. See notes 10-16 and accom-
panying text infra.
B - Medical treatment will only be compelled if the nature of the illness is
assessed to be less voluntary and more important to the overall health of
the patient. See notes 17-29 and accompanying text infra.
C - The trend is to respect the patient's refusal to medical treatment under
these conditions provided that there are no dependent minors, the patient is
not pregnant and is compos mentis. See notes 30-69 and accompanying text
infra.
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a manner, courts have provided the medical community with a limited
practical set of guidelines within which they can safely operate. Unfor-
tunately, in most instances courts have avoided deciding the underly-
ing and more difficult issue of whether a right to die flows naturally
and legally from the right to privacy. This comment will examine the
duty of a physician to treat a minor or adult patient who refuses treat-
ment under emergency circumstances, his obligation to generally treat
minors despite parental refusal in nonemergency situations, his legal
responsibility to abide by a competent adult's choice to refuse treat-
ment in nonemergencies, and finally, his duty to secure proper consent
to treat or not to treat incompetent adults under nonemergency cir-
cumstances.
II. MINORS AND ADULTS: REFUSAL UNDER EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
Although it was noted earlier that it is important to make a distinc-
tion as to the type of patient involved-minor, competent adult, or in-
competent adult-the distinction is unnecessary in the analysis of an
emergency situation; all of the patients are treated in the same man-
ner.1" This proposition is implicitly supported by Dunham v. Wright," a
case in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
ruled that the care of patients in an emergency was not restricted to
one type of patient. Dunham established the general principle that in
an emergency, where the doctor is unable to consult with the patient
to secure the requisite informed consent, consent is unnecessary.
Under the facts of Dunham, the physicians were forced to perform an
emergency thyroidectomy without the patient's consent. The court
determined that the need for the physician to obtain consent is ob-
viated by an emergency which places the patient in immediate danger
and makes it impractical to secure such consent."
A corollary of the Dunham decision is that under a given set of cir-
cumstances, a doctor may treat a patient despite that patient's attemp-
ted refusal to consent. The rationale supporting this conclusion is that
in order to have an adequate informed consent, the patient must
understand the risks, alternatives, and consequences of the proposed
treatment."' Implicitly, in an emergency, the patient would not be able
D - The patient's choice to refuse medical treatment will be respected provided
that the right is asserted by a guardian exercising a substituted judgment
for that patient. See notes 70-91 and accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.103 (Purdon Supp. 1979) (supports the
proposition that all patients are treated in a like manner in an emergency situation).
11. 423 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1970).
12. Id. at 941.
13. ld. at 944.
610 Vo1.18:607
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to make adequate evaluations due to his serious medical condition.
Therefore, if the patient were not capable of appraising his condition
and understanding the risks, alternatives and consequences, he would
not be able to render an informed consent. If the patient were in-
capable of giving his informed consent, it logically follows that he
would be incapable of effectively refusing treatment for the same
reasons."
The delineation of the circumstances actually constituting an
emergency is an important aspect of this special situation in which
treatment can be performed without consent. The Dunham court
stressed the concept of immediacy and rejected the plaintiff's defini-
tion that there should be a sudden or unexpected event which creates
a temporarily dangerous condition usually necessitating quick action. 5
But Dunham's definition of an emergency situation is an elusive and
open-ended one, which is determined by striking a balance between the
right of the patient to choose the treatment he wishes to undergo and
the freedom of the physician to practice responsible and progressive
medicine without fear of frequent litigation. 6 According to Dunham,
then, a court possesses a wide realm of discretion in deciding whether
the facts of a particular case establish the existence of an emergency
situation. Although Dunham insures that a physician will not be liable
for acting without consent in an emergency, the decision, in failing to
define concretely the parameters of an emergency situation, is not as
practical in application as it first appears. Thus, physicians remain un-
sure of the proper course of action in an allegedly emergent situation
where the patient is either unable to give his consent or has refused
medical treatment. To resolve this dilemma, physicians, relying upon
practical experience, have categorized emergencies into two distinct
types: one is an immediate emergency in which minutes are crucial,
and the other is nonurgent in nature, in which hours become critical.
Unquestionably, a patient's refusal under the former situation would
fall within the purview of the Dunham holding, but the latter situation
may more appropriately be considered among the problems associated
with refusal of treatment in a nonemergency setting.
14. It is of interest to note that the Dunham decision, and the logical conclusions that
may be drawn from that decision, focused upon the concern of urgency and finality
associated with emergency situations when there was not time to debate the merits of the
right to refuse treatment. The philosophical concern of personal choice or of the right to
die arguably becomes secondary in these situations.
15. 423 F.2d at 947.
16. Id. at 942.
1980
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III. MINORS: REFUSAL UNDER NONURGENT EMERGENCIES AND
NONEMERGENCY SITUATIONS
When making the decision of whether or not to compel treatment in
a nonurgent emergency and a nonemergent situation, the courts con-
sider the specific status of the patient: where the patient is a minor,
the courts require that an adult who is a parent or guardian must con-
sent to treatment for the child, and the legislatures have enacted
statutory provisions ensuring to the child the necessary treatment for
the protection of his life and limb." Moreover, the judiciary, invoking
the doctrine of parens patriae, will disregard a parental decision if that
decision does not appear to be in the best interest of the child. One of
the earlier leading decisions dealing generally with parental in-
terference was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1944.
In Prince v. Massachusetts,8 the defendant state had a statute which
provided that no minor shall sell on the streets or public place an arti-
cle of merchandise. In addition, the law provided that it was unlawful
for anyone to furnish a minor with any article which he or she knew
the minor intended to sell in violation of the law. The plaintiff was con-
victed under this statute for directing her child to sell Jehovah's
Witness material on the street. The Supreme Court upheld the convic-
tion, concluding that neither the right of religion nor the right of
parenthood may stand beyond regulation or limitation. 9 Parents, the
court stated, may be free to become martyrs themselves, but this does
not mean that they are free in identical circumstances to make mar-
tyrs of their children before the children have reached the age of full
and legal discretion and can make legally enforceable choices on behalf
of themselves.0 Prince indicates the willingness of the United States
Supreme Court to protect the child, despite objections of the parents.
However, the question remains as to what extent the court will in-
tercede in the parental-child relationship when the issue is a medical
one.
Twenty years after the Prince v. Massachusetts decision, this ques-
tion was addressed by the United States District Court for the
17. Pennsylvania has enacted such a protective statute. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §
10104 (Purdon 1977) ("Medical, dental and health services may be rendered to minors of
any age without the consent of a parent or legal guardian when, in the physician's judg-
ment, an attempt to secure consent would result in delay of treatment which would in-
crease the risk to the minor's life or health").
18. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). Although Prince is not directly on point since the refusal of
medical treatment was not in issue, it is of importance because it established certain
parental duties in the case of minors.
19. Id. at 166.
20. Id. at 170.
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Western District of Washington in Jehovah's Witnesses v. Kings Coun-
ty Hospital,2 a decision which was premised upon the Prince case. The
gist of the complaint in Jehovah's Witnesses was that the state court,
in response to petititons of doctors and hospitals caring for the plain-
tiffs' children, had improperly compelled blood transfusions for those
children. It was argued that the mere belief that the exercise of paren-
tal judgment contradicted sound medical advice did not justify taking
the children from the protection of their parents. The court rejected the
parents' argument and determined that a state, acting as parens
patriae, may compel blood transfusions for a minor whose life is en-
dangered. The court concluded that the parents' right to practice
religion does not include the liberty to expose the child to death.'
Clearly, the court demonstrated its willingness to protect the child
from an untimely death. Because the court invoked such a strong
paternal stance in Jehovah's Witnesses, the decision impliedly sug-
gests that the minor himself does not have an enforceable right to
refuse medical treatment when that refusal could result in his death.
Yet, the decision, in failing to outline the permissible limits of judicial
intervention, has not conclusively answered the prevailing question:
namely, to what extent will a court interfere in the realm of "parental
decision" when the physical welfare of a child is the issue before the
court?
Faced with parental refusal based upon religious grounds, some
courts have intervened when there was the possibility of some perma-
nent affliction, even though the affliction may not have been life-
endangering to the child. This was exemplified by In re Karwath,'3 a
case in which three children were diagnosed as suffering sore throats
and repetitious ear infections due to inflamed, infected adenoids and
tonsils. The prognosis indicated that without an operative procedure,
some permanent loss of hearing might have resulted, but that the lives
of the children were not threatened; in light of these facts, the pro-
cedure was considered to be a voluntary one. The children's father
believed in religious faith healing and refused to grant the required
consent. The Supreme Court of Iowa, however, ordered that the
children undergo the required surgery, concluding that the state has a
duty to see that children receive proper medical care and treatment
and that the parent has no right to deprive his children of necessary
medical care. The Iowa court premised its decision upon the rationale
that the state has the legal custodial duty of care, even in the absence
21. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
22. Id. at 493.
23. 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972).
1980 613
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of immediate risk of life or limb."4 Because of the potentially far-
reaching effect of this case, in terms of the state's usurping the right
of the parent to care for the child when the minor's life is not en-
dangered, the decision has not been universally accepted. 5
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision of In re Green' has
tempered the Iowa Supreme Court's expansive view. Green involved a
mother who refused blood transfusions for her son because of her
religious beliefs. The child, who suffered from a curvature of the spine,
needed the blood for corrective surgery. Here, the court determined
that the blood transfusion and surgical procedure, which did not in-
volve a life-threatening condition, could only be compelled over the ob-
jection of the mother when the child himself expressed a desire to
undergo such treatment." Therefore, Green not only modified the
thrust of the Iowa court's prior decision, which would have compelled
medical treatment without concern for the seriousness of the patient's
condition, but also suggested that a minor did have some control over
his own physical well-being, at least in situations not involving a threat
to life.
The trend is clear regarding compulsory medical treatment of
minors: where the life of the minor is endangered, regardless of the
religious objections of the parent, the minor will be treated; and where
the minor is not involved in a life-threatening situation, the court may
also compel treatment despite parental objection," provided the minor
24. Id. at 151. See also In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955), which posed
the question whether a fourteen year old child can be petititoned to come under the
custody of the state so permission can be granted for surgery to correct the congenital
defects of a harelip and cleft palate. The court held that the granting of such a petition
was within the discretion of the trier of facts. But in dictum, the court stated that there
was such a power on behalf of the state to take custody of the child, and to compel
medical procedures where there was a serious physiological impairment which neither
threatened the physical life or health of the child nor raised a risk of contagion to the
public. Id. at 84-86, 126 N.E.2d at 822-23. See also In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278
N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972), which reaffirmed the decision in the Seiferth case.
The court held that religious objection to transfusion does not present a bar, at least
where the transfusion is necessary to the success of required surgery.
25. See, e.g., In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972). See also In re Frank, 41
Wash. 2d 294, 248 P.2d 553 (1952) (parent refused to have the child's speech impediment
surgically corrected, and court determined that there was no reason to compel treatment
because the child's life was not endangered); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765
(1942) (court refused to compel medical treatment to correct a congenitally deformed arm
of a twelve year old child because the mother, in her capacity as a parent, was to make
the decision and, further, the child could survive with the defect).
26. 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
27. Id. at 348-49, 292 A.2d at 392.
28. See notes 21-27 and accompanying text supra for a review of the flexible ap-
proach the courts have taken in compelling medical treatment for minors over parental
objection.
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himself requests the treatment."
IV. COMPETENT ADULTS: REFUSAL UNDER NONURGENT EMERGENCIES
AND NONEMERGENCY SITUATIONS
Because there is usually time to secure an informed consent from a
competent adult in nonurgent emergencies or nonemergent situations,
courts need not assume a parental or protective role and, thus, have
rarely compelled a competent adult to undergo medical treatment
against his or her strenuous refusal. However, in very limited situa-
tions, which almost always involve a patient with a dependent minor,
courts have reluctantly compelled treatment for the competent adult
patient. The seminal decision is In re President and Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc.'O In that case, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit granted the hospital permission to ad-
minister blood transfusions to a patient in a nonurgent emergency,
because the patient would have expired within several hours if she had
not received blood to replace that which was lost due to a ruptured
ulcer. The order was granted over the strenuous religious objections of
the patient. The court's decision was premised upon three factors. Initially,
the court reasoned that since the patient was in extremis, hard-
ly compos mentis,32 and therefore barely able to understand the gravi-
ty of her condition, the state could assume the responsibility of guar-
dianship, at least to the extent of authorizing medical treatment to
save her life. Secondly, and most importantly, the court noted that the
patient was a parent to a dependent minor. The court was seriously
concerned that if the parent refused medical treatment and subse-
29. See Bothman v. Warren B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 769, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, hearing denied
(1979), cert denied, 100 S. CL 1597 (1980), in which the California Court of Appeal held
that when dealing with a mentally retarded child, whose well-being was in question, the
court could appoint a guardian to override the parental choice and compel treatment only
when it was in the best interest of the mentally retarded child. The court upheld the deci-
sion of the parents to forego lifesaving cardiac surgery after reviewing the particular
facts of the case. The child was a twelve year old boy who suffered from Down's Syn-
drome. Because the affliction subjected the patient to a higher than average morbidity,
the court determined that the parents' decision was in the best interest of the child.
Although at first glance the decision appears to be inconsistent with the general rule that
courts will compel treatment for children despite parental objection, the New York court's
emphasizing the best interest of the child is in fact consistent with the underlying ra-
tionales of the general rule. For a sharply critical comment on the case see NEWSWEEK,
April 14, 1980, at 112.
30. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
31. "Extremis" is defined as being sick, beyond hope of recovery, and near death.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
32. "Non compos mentis" is defined as not being of sound mind, and embraces all
varieties of mental derangement. Id. at 1200.
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quently died, a voluntary abandonment of the child would result and
the community would bear the burden of caring for the child. Because
of this perceived state interest, the court of appeals was able to invoke
the doctrine of parens patriae to prevent a voluntary abandonment of
the child by compelling the parent to undergo the needed medical
treatment." Thirdly, the court considered self-homicide, the ultimate
result of the patient's refusal to undergo medical treatment, to be a
crime even though the basis of the patient's refusal was founded upon
religious convictions."
Interestingly enough, the Georgetown College court rejected the
suggestion of the patient's counsel that the patient had the constitu-
tionally protected authority to command her doctor to treat her under
limitations which would produce death. Rather, the court determined
that the principle which dictated that life and liberty are inalienable
rights did not provide the answer to whether the state can condone
martyrdom." Since a further discussion of the constitutional issue is
notably absent from the opinion, it would appear that the court at-
tempted to avoid the real substantive issue of whether there is a con-
stitutional basis for permitting a patient to choose death.
Subsequent courts have relied upon the Georgetown College deci-
sion to compel medical treatment for a competent adult; more
specifically, these courts compel treatment where the patient appears
unable to understand the gravity of the situation and where the pa-
tient's death would result in an abandonment of his children. However,
when either or both of these Georgetown College considerations are
absent, the courts have not been consistent in their findings. For ex-
ample, not long in time after Georgetown College, in United States v.
George,6 the District Court for the District of Connecticut applied the
Georgetown College reasoning to a slightly dissimilar factual pattern
but nonetheless reached a similar conclusion. The George court
ordered compulsory medical treatment for an adult patient who, like
the patient in Georgetown College, was a parent to dependent minors,
had been voluntarily admitted to the hospital, and refused blood
transfusions on religious grounds; but who, unlike the Georgetown Col-
lege patient, was probably compos mentis. This latter condition,
33. 331 F.2d at 1008.
34. Id. at 1009.
35. Id. That the patient cannot dictate to her physician a course of treatment which
approaches malpractice is further developed in United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752
(D. Conn. 1965). See note 36 and accompanying text infra.
36. 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965). The patient in George was suffering from a rup-
tured ulcer which caused serious bleeding within the gastrointestinal tract. Blood transfu-
sions were required to replace sixty-five percent of the patient's red blood cells in order
to prevent death.
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however, was subject to question because the doctors were in
disagreement concerning the patient's competency. 7 But the competen-
cy question was not deemed significant enough to preclude application
of the Georgetown College principle, 8 especially when the court took
into consideration the patient's minor children who would become
wards of the state if their parent would be permitted to die. To but-
tress the argument for compelling treatment in the case, the George
court developed an additional consideration: specifically, it was an-
nounced that where a patient voluntarily admitted himself to the
hospital, he could not dictate to the attending physician a course of
treatment that would amount to malpractice. 9 According to the George
court, then, a doctor cannot be required to ignore the mandate of his
own convictions and duty, even in the name of religious exercise, and
the patient has no right to demand mistreatment."0 By voluntarily ad-
mitting himself to a hospital for treatment, the patient has, in the
court's view, also given his general consent for treatment. This view-
point perhaps helps to explain that part of the George court's opinion
which states that the patient could resist the court order compel-
ling treatment by simply placing his hand over the injection area.' The
patient, however, accepted the treatment without incident.'2 Providing
this alternative to the patient could be construed as an indication that
the court recognized the patient's right to revoke his prior decision to
submit himself for treatment when he voluntarily entered the hospital.
Regardless, it again should be noted that the court did not deal direct-
ly with the right of the patient to choose life or death; instead, the
court focused upon the ancillary Georgetown College common law
arguments."
37. 1I at 753. Although the patient may have appeared to be coherent, the record in-
dicated that the treating physician doubted whether such a patient under medical cir-
cumstances of serious internal bleeding, where two-thirds of the blood volume had been
lost, could be mentally competent.
38. Id. at 754.
39. Id
40. JI
41. Id. at 753. This has troubled commentators and caused them to speculate as to
the reason for the court's action. See Riga, Compulsory Medical Treatment of Adults, 22
CATH. LAW. 105 (1976).
42. 239 F. Supp. at 754.
43. In Georgetown College, the court indicated that if treatment were compelled
over the objection of the patient there would be no violation of the patient's religious
practices. It was reasoned that where the court undertook the responsibility of giving in-
formed consent for the transfusion, the patient did not violate his religious convictions
since he never actually consented to any treatment; instead, the decision rested on the
conscience of the court. 331 F.2d at 1009. The court indicated that this rationale resolved
the dilemma for the patient who seeks medical treatment but simultaneously does not
6171980
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Raleigh Fitkins-Paul Morgan Memorial v. Anderson"' represented
another situation in which medical treatment was compelled although
the Georgetown considerations were.not satisfied, for the adult patient
was compos mentis and the existence of a dependent minor was ques-
tionable. In Anderson, a pregnant woman required blood, but had
refused the necessary transfusion on religious grounds. The New
Jersey Supreme Court determined that without the needed blood
transfusions, both the unborn child and the mother would certainly ex-
pire. Because the welfare of the mother and the fetus were so inter-
twined, ordering treatment for the mother was done under the
auspices of protecting the life of the unborn child.'8 Although the
Anderson court recognized the ability of the adult patient to clearly
understand the seriousness of her condition and to make her own deci-
sions, the court's greatest concern was for the unborn child, who would
be directly affected by the mother's decision. The status of the fetus in
utero was considered to be equivalent to the status of a dependent
minor, thereby providing the New Jersey judiciary with the opportuni-
ty to compel treatment."' By focusing upon the right of the unborn
child to live, the New Jersey Supreme Court was able to avoid
deciding the more difficult issue of the adult patient's right to die."
However, two years later, in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v.
Heston,'8 the New Jersey Supreme Court did address the right to die
issue. Heston involved an auto accident victim who was single, of ma-
jority age, and had no children. Although the victim seriously needed
blood transfusions, she vigorously refused them. The traditional
Georgetown College argument, which permitted a court to compel
treatment for the adult by acting as parens patriae to protect any
minor dependents involved, could not be utilized in Heston. The New
Jersey court was convinced of the validity of the Georgetown College
precedent, but the instant factual situation did not present the prob-
lem of dependent children. Unable to utilize Georgetown College to cir-
cumvent the right to die issue, the court confronted it.
At the outset, the opinion boldly stated that there was no constitu-
want to act in contradiction of his relgious beliefs. Utilizing this reasoning, the court was
able to resolve the immediate medical problem without making a determination of the pa-
tient's right to die.
44. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cerL denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1969).
45. Id at 423, 201 A.2d at 537.
46. Id. at 424, 201 A.2d at 538.
47. Since the fetus was thirty-two weeks old, the problem of whether or not it was
viable was not the issue. It is important to note, however, that the case was decided in
1964, long before nontherapeutic abortions were recognized and, therefore, before the
whole question of when life begins was debated.
48. 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
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tional right for anyone to choose death. 9 The opinion equated suicide
with refusal to accept medical treatment" and reasoned that since
suicide was a crime under common law, state intervention did not in-
fringe on the constitutional right of any person attempting self-
destruction. 1 Moreover, the court stated that although protection of
religious beliefs is absolute, conduct in pursuance of these beliefs is not
wholly immune from governmental restraint.2 The court therefore re-
jected the patient's contention that her refusal to treatment was con-
stitutionally protected as religious freedom because her faith ordained
death. The New Jersey Supreme Court further decided that where the
hospital and staff were involuntary hosts and their interests were con-
trary to the religious beliefs of the patient, it was not unreasonable to
resolve the problem by permitting the hospital and staff to act in con-
cert with their professional ethics." Finding no constitutional right to
die, the court compelled medical treatment over the patient's refusal.
Although the issue was dealt with in a most conclusory manner and
the opinion offered little supportive analysis, Heston was one of the
first decisions examining the right to die question. After Heston, the
intermediary New Jersey courts need not search for a circuitous
means to compel treatment for a competent adult; instead, because it
has been determined by the state's supreme court that no person
possesses the right to die, the New Jersey courts can presumably in-
tervene in all life-death situations to compel medical treatment for a
competent adult. '
When a similar problem was presented before the Illinois Supreme
Court, that court did not confront the constitutional right to die issue
49. Id at 580, 279 A.2d at 672.
50. Id at 582, 279 A.2d at 673.
51. Id at 580, 279 A.2d at 672.
52. Id
53. Id at 583, 279 A.2d at 673.
54. See also In re Dell, 1 Pa. D. & C.3d 655 (C.P. Allegheny 1975), in which a Penn-
sylvania Court of Common Pleas had reached a similar conclusion. The trial judge decided
to compel the administration of the blood transfusion for a patient with a bleeding ulcer,
despite the patient's religious objections. Adopting the Heston approach, the judge con-
curred with the rationale of Georgetown College but made it even easier to compel treat-
ment. The judge argued that public policy abhors the act of self-destruction. Since this
would be the inevitable result of ignoring medical treatment, it is not to be permitted.
The judge determined that even though there were no dependent minors, medical treat-
ment should be compelled because equal treatment of patients being denied the right to
refuse medical treatment is a logical precept of equal protection under the law. Id at 659.
Finally, the trial judge concluded that compelling medical treatment did not constitute an
infringement of freedom of religion for two reasons: namely, that there were no en-
forceable criminal sanctions for the practice of religion and that the practice of the dic-
tates of one's religion was permissible except when a life or death situation is involved.
Id at 661.
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with the same boldness exhibited by the Heston court, but rather
looked to the Georgetown College precedent and general constitutional
notions of religious freedom. Because the patient in In re Brooks5 was
an adult, fully conscious at the time of admission, without children, and
fully aware that death would ensue without medical attention, the Il-
linois Supreme Court concluded that the Georgetown College con-
siderations were not met, and thus, that medical treatment could not
be compelled." Even though the Illinois court concluded that it is
foolish for a patient to refuse needed blood, it could not justify compul-
sion of treatment on that ground.57 Alternatively, the court buttressed
its conclusion of rejecting compulsory treatment upon the first amend-
ment religious guarantees; in this regard, the court concluded that the
government's imposition of limitations would be permissible only when
the exercise of certain religious beliefs created a clear and present
danger to the public health and welfare.58 Accordingly, the court
reversed the order of the lower court to appoint a conservator to order
blood transfusions.59 The significance of the Heston decision lies in the
court's implicit recognition of the right to die, thus permitting an in-
dividual to choose a medical course of action that would result in his
death.0
An intermediate New York appellate court reiterated this conclu-
sion in Erikson v. Dilgard,1 by holding that a competent adult patient
who had no minor children was entitled to a limited right of refusing
medical treatment. Since the patient ultimately decides whether or not
the medical appraisal of his condition is correct,"2 and since he is the
55. 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
56. Id. at 368, 205 N.E.2d at 439.
57. Id. at 373, 205 N.E.2d at 442.
58. Id. at 374, 205 N.E.2d at 442.
59. Id. at 373-74, 205 N.E.2d at 443.
60. See also Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972), in which
the court said that a state should not have appointed a guardian to grant permission for a
blood transfusion. The court reasoned that the conservator's order of treatment was in
violation of the patient's religious beliefs and, therefore, abridged the first amendment
freedom to exercise religious beliefs where a substantial state interest was absent. Id. at
130. Even though Brooks did not involve dependent minor children, the court relied on
the case as a sound legal approach to the problem in terms of balancing the state interest
against the individual's interest in protecting his first amendment guarantees. On its face,
this factual distinction would appear to preclude the Holmes court from relying on the
Brooks decision. The court, however, noted that the existence of a minor child only
became known after the conservator had been appointed. The court stated that the defen-
dants could not assert the presence of the child as an after-the-fact justification for the
state-authorized actions since the state itself could not have balanced its interest with
that of the decedent's first amendment right. Id.
61. 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
62. Id. at 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
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sole object of that decision," the court resolved that the patient alone
should be allowed to make the final choice of whether or not to pro-
ceed with the proposed treatment." Because the focus of Erikson was
not upon the Georgetown College considerations nor upon the general
constitutional notions which Brooks had advanced, but rather upon the
patient's right to self-determination, this decision came the closest to
recognizing an individual's right to die as flowing from the right to
privacy.
A Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas went further and clearly
enunciated the principle that there was a constitutional basis for
recognizing that a patient's refusal of medical treatment could extend
to the right to die. The court, in In re Yetter, 5 refused to appoint a
guardian for a sixty-year old female for the purposes of authorizing a
biopsy and surgical removal of her breast. It was concluded that the
patient was fully capable of giving her proper informed consent," and
63. IS
64. I& See In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 1966), in which
the court refused to order the amputation of the gangrenous leg of an elderly woman. The
prognosis was not certain as to the benefits of such surgery, and the ability of the patient'
to make this decision was in doubt. Id. at 618, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 626. But the court, acting
consistently with Enikson, upheld the patient's choice to refuse medical treatment.
Nemser and the later case of In re Melido, 88 Misc. 2d 974. 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct.
1976), support the New York court's recognition of a right of choice which may result in
demise. In Melido, the court held that the patient's right to be left alone could only be in-
fringed where there was a compelling state interest. Though such an interest existed to
compel treatment for a competent adult with children, no interest existed with respect to
an unencumbered competent adult. Id. at 975, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 524. See also Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1978), affd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980), in which
the Florida court held that a seventy-three year old man suffering from amyothrophic
lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's disease) should be permitted to be removed from life sup-
port devices. It was determined that the patient was capable of making this decision. His
right to refuse treatment could only be tempered by a state interest, which was not pre-
sent. Therefore, the court held that a competent adult who was suffering from a terminal
illness, whose family agreed with his wish to discontinue life support treatment, and
whose condition was not self induced, has the right to refuse medical treatment based on
his constitutional right of privacy. I& at 162.
65. 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (C.P. Northampton 1973). This case is important even
though it is of limited authority because it is one of the first to link the right to refuse
medical treatment with the right of privacy. It should be noted, however, that many cases
like Yetter are lower court decisions because the family or patient often will not seek an
appeal. Generally, the treatment has been rendered, and the patients are not interested in
pursuing any further legal redress.
66. See Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. 1978), in which the Appeals Court
of Massachusetts held that a seventy-seven year old widow, who was suffering from
gangrene in the right leg and foot, could refuse to consent to an amputation of the in-
fected extremity. The rationale of the court was that the constitutional right to privacy
included the right to self-determination. See also In re Quakenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282,
383 A.2d 785 (1978). in which the court upheld a seventy-two year old patient's refusal to
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that a guardian should not be appointed to override her choice. Despite
its limited precedential value, the significance of the Yetter decision
lies in the fact that the court premised its decision upon the theory
that the right to privacy included the right of a patient in certain cir-
cumstances to refuse medical treatment even though that decision may
seem unwise. A court has finally sought to examine and to express the
medical issue in terms of the right of privacy.
Therefore, when dealing with competent adults in nonurgent
emergencies or nonemergent situations, the courts are only partially in
agreement. Under special circumstances, where the patient is responsi-
ble for minors and the patient's death would result in those minors
becoming wards of the state, the courts will compel medical
treatment. 7 But, there is a split in the decisions of the courts where
the competent adult does not have any minor dependents and is com-
pos mentis.68 In those instances, the courts have fashioned first amend-
ment constitutional arguments, have attempted to address the right to
die issue, and have not been consistent in determining whether the pa-
tient may refuse treatment when the result will be his death. 9
have both of his gangrenous legs amputated. The court also recognized that the right to
privacy included the right to refuse medical treatment despite an extremely dim prog-
nosis. See generally Suenram v. Society of Valley Hosp., 155 N.J. Super. 593, 383 A.2d
143 (1977), in which the New Jersey Superior Court held that an informed patient had a
right to choose or to reject cancer treatment on the advice of her doctor. But see Long
Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center v. Levitt, 73 Misc. 2d 395, 342 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup.
Ct. 1973), in which the patient required an amputation of his lower extremity in order to
save his life. The patient waivered as to consent and then finally refused; this caused the
court to question the patient's initial ability to consent. Therefore, the court appointed a
guardian who made the choice for the patient and granted consent for the operation.
67. A recent case decided by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was In re
Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972). In holding that there was no compelling state interest
justifying the overriding of the patient's religious decision not to receive blood, the
Osborne court did not break any new ground. But the means by which the court came to
this conclusion is of significance. The patient was a married male with two dependent
minors. The court held that the mere fact that there were dependent third parties in and
of itself did not constitute a state interest, as had been the indication in Georgetown Col-
lege, Brooks and Holmes. The judge was able to ascertain that the children would be
taken care of because of an arrangement made by the husband prior to his demise, and
therefore, there was no state interest to compel treatment.
68. It is questionable whether any person who is rapidly approaching his demise is
capable of being compos mentis. It would logically seem that a deteriorating medical con-
dition would severely reduce the mental abilities of the patient to make such critical deci-
sions.
69. It is interesting to note that all of the cases dealing with refusal of medical treat-
ment by a competent adult involve treatment of patients who most certainly would die if
they did not receive such medical attention. This can possibly be explained in that the
hospital's liability is minimal when the patient refused treatment for a condition which
would not result in his demise. Therefore, in such cases, the hospital is not reluctant to
abide by the patient's wishes.
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V. INCOMPETENT ADULTS: PATIENT'S REFUSAL UNDER NONEMERGENCY
SITUATIONS
Where the patient is considered competent, he is at least able to
make a knowledgeable evaluation and decision with respect to his con-
dition, thereby enabling a court to weigh the patient's desires along
with the other important factors" in determining whether the
necessary medical care should be compelled. But an incompetent, by
the very nature of his mental status, is not able to aid the court in a
determination of his medical care. The type of patient considered to be
an incompetent would include, inter alia, patients legally adjudged to
be incompetent, patients in a comatose state, and those patients ap-
parently awake but incoherent, irrational or incapable of making a
knowledgeable evaluation of their condition. The situation involving in-
competents is becoming more prevalent due to the availability of new-
ly advanced procedures and medical devices, including organ
transplants, sophisticated respiratory and circulatory devices, and
chemotherapeutic treatments, which contribute to the artificial pro-
longment of an individual's life, well after the individual has lost his
cognitive abilities.
The first decision of major precedential value which addressed this
difficult problem was rendered by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
In re Quinlan." The patient, a twenty-one year old woman, was
diagnosed as comatose with severe brain damage, and required a
respirator to sustain breathing. She was charactized as being in a
chronic and persistent vegetative state."2 The prognosis was poor
because there was no form of treatment or cure available, and she
could only be maintained in her present state with the aid of
mechanical devices. As a result, the girl's father requested that the ex-
traordinary medical treatment already being provided for his daughter
be discontinued.
The New Jersey court determined that a decision to terminate
medical treatment could be made by the father on behalf of the patient
even though such discontinuance could result in her death."3 The key
70. For a discussion of the other factors involved in the courts' decisions, see notes
30-69 and accompanying text supra.
71. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
72. Id. at 25-27, 355 A.2d at 655. The patient retained only the vegetative portion of
the neurological functions, which included maintenance of temperature, blood pressure,
and heart rate, while the actual breathing and heart function were mechanically assisted.
The patient had also lost all cognitive functions, but there were no signs of brain death as
defined in the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School Criteria. Id. at 24-27, 355
A.2d at 655-56. For a further discussion of the criteria see A Definition of Irreversible
Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968).
73. 70 N.J. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664.
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issue upon which the court focused was the constitutional right to
privacy. A sliding scale analysis was employed. It provided that the
state's interest in compelling treatment must be balanced against the
individual's constitutionally protected right to privacy. The privacy
right, the court determined, assumes prominence over the state in-
terest as the bodily invasion becomes extensive and prospect of a
good prognosis diminishes. Therefore, a point is ultimately reached in
this balancing process whereby the patient's right to privacy
supersedes the state's interest, and the patient's choice as to his treat-
ment must be respected. ' Under the circumstances in Quinlan, where
the life sustaining treatment would have necessitated continuous and
substantial interference with bodily privacy and where there was no
medical expectation of recovery, the right to privacy was held to
prevail over the state's interest.
Having determined that competent adults possessed a privacy
right 5 which permitted them to choose medical treatment, the New
Jersey Supreme Court then had to decide whether this right was ap-
plicable to incompetent adult patients. Toward that end, the court
posed a hypothetical question: If Karen Quinlan could be lucid for a
short interval (yet still be burdened with the same prognosis), and if
she were aware of her irreversible condition, would she choose to ter-
minate the treatment?"6 The court concluded that the answer would be
in the affirmative." It was reasoned that the patient's right to refuse
treatment should not be destroyed by her personal lack of ability to
exercise a choice. Therefore, the court decided that the patient's
guardian should be legally permitted to assert the subjective choice of
the incompetent.
The Quinlan decision clearly establishes the principle that the
guardian for an incompetent adult patient has the legal right to refuse
continuation of medical treatment for the patient, even if the ultimate
result of the guardian's decision is the patient's demise. It should be
noted that the guardian's decision cannot be arbitrary, but rather,
must reasonably mirror the decision of the patient had he been capable
of evaluating the circumstances."' It is interesting to note that the New
74. 1&
75. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. For a discussion as to the existence of the right of
privacy see note 7 supra.
76. 1&
77. I& at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. Interestingly enough, Karen was removed from the
respirator in May of 1976 and has since survived free of any mechanical devices.
NEWSWEEK, March 3, 1980, at 14.
78. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664. The opinion indicated that the guardian's judgment
should be a type of substitute and not a best interest nature for incompetents. But, it is a
best interest test at least in the sense that the personal interests of the patient are con-
624 Voi.18:607
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Jersey Supreme Court eleven years earlier, in Heston, had asserted
that there was no constitutional right to die." The Quinlan court at-
tempted to resolve this blatant contradiction by qualifying when the
right can be advanced: apparently, the right cannot be asserted in in-
stances where the patient's prognosis is good and a long fruitful life is
assured, as were the circumstances in Heston; alternatively, where
the prognosis is poor and the patient will remain in a chronic
vegetative condition, the state will not be permitted to override the
patient's decision to choose death.
The subsequent decision of Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz8' by the Massachusetts Supreme Court was concerned with
the right of an incompetent to refuse treatment and essentially
reiterated the basic thrust of Quinlan." The facts involved a patient
who was a sixty-seven year old, mentally retarded male with an in-
telligence quotient of ten and a mental age of thirty-two months."
Therefore, he clearly was unable to comprehend the seriousness of his
condition, which was diagnosed as a form of leukemia." The condition
was not curable and the standard medical practice in such a case was
to start the patient on'a chemotherapeutic regimen, an extremely pain-
ful and expensive treatment which at best prolongs life for a short
period of time."
Considering the hopelessness of the patient's prognosis, the court-
appointed guardian, in the forum of the Probate Court, decided to
withhold consent to treatment. Six months later the patient died. The
court, in affirming the guardian's decision, focused, as did the Quinlan
opinion, upon the individual's right to self-determination as ex-
trapolated from the right to privacy." Since this right was available to
a competent patient, the court stressed that the same right must also
sidered, not the best interest of all society. See Brant, The Right to Die in Peace:
Substituted Consent and the Mentally Incompetent, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 959 (1977).
79. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
80. 70 N.J. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
81. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1976).
82. See notes 71-80 and accompanying text supra.
83. 370 N.E.2d at 420
84. The form of leukemia is mycoblastic monocytic leukemia, often called "cancer of
the blood." The only known treatment is chemotherapy. 2 J. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY'S DIc-
TIONARY OF MEDICINE 388 (1979).
85. 370 N.E.2d at 421. Without medical treatment a patient suffering from
mycoblastic monocytic leukemia would expire in a short time without much discomfort. Id.
at 422.
86. Id. at 424. The Court specifically stated that: "The constitutional right to privacy,
as we conceive it, is an expression of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-
determination as fundamental constituents of life." Id. at 426.
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be available for the incompetent. 7 Therefore, as in Quinlan, it was
determined that the decision of the guardian has to be a substituted
subjective judgment which would approximate as closely as possible
that choice which the patient himself would have made.8 But the
Saikewicz court was troubled, because unlike the situation in Quinlan,
Saikewicz would never have been able to make a knowledgeable
evaluation or choice due to his severe mental retardation. This ap-
parent dilemma was reconciled by determining that the substituted
judgment should be made as if the patient were competent, while view-
ing the present and future incompetency of the individual as only one
of the factors which would necessarily affect the decisionmaking pro-
cess of a competent patient. 9 After weighing the factors in favor of
treatment, and those favoring withholding treatment, the court found
that the guardian's decision to refuse administration of chemotherapy
was correct. 0  I
The conclusion drawn from these two decisions is that an incompe-
tent adult has the same right as a competent adult with respect to the
right to refuse medical treatment and the right to privacy. The major
difference is that the right of the incompetent must be asserted by a
guardian who, in making his decision, must exercise a substituted con-
sent which would reflect the patient's choice if he were capable of such
a decision."
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment developed a model to encompass the most common
87. Id. at 427.
88. It is argued that a competent adult would probably have opted for chemotherapy
to prolong his life. But that factor is not a proper analysis. Rather, medical factors as well
as personal needs must be taken into account. This becomes a personalized substitution
approach by the guardian for that particular patient. Under these circumstances, refusal
of treatment was appropriate. Id. at 430-31.
89. Id. at 431.
90. The factors considered to weigh in favor of administration of chemotherapy were:
(1) the fact that most people elect chemotherapy and (2) the chance of a longer life. Id. The
factors weighing against administration were: (1) patient's age, (2) probable side effects of
treatment, (3) low chance for remission, (4) certainty that treatment will cause immediate
suffering, and (5) patient's inability to cooperate with physicians. Id. at 432.
91. See In re Eichner (N.Y. App. Div., filed March 27, 1980), for a discussion of an in-
competent patient's right to discontinue medical treatment. The New York appellate
court, following the lead of the Quinlan and Saikewicz decisions, authorized the discon-
tinuation of extraordinary medical treatment for a patient in a chronic vegetative coma.
Specifically, the court determined that since there was a constitutional right to refuse
medical treatment for competent adults, the same right must be available to the incompe-
tent patient. The right, however, must be asserted by a guardian utilizing the substituted
judgment standard.
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circumstances under which a patient might assert a right to refuse
medical treatment. According to the model, in a nonurgent emergency
or a nonemergent situation only two categories of patients can request
the discontinuation of medical treatment even though the ultimate
result of such a choice may be death. These two categories include the
competent adult patient who is free of any minor dependents, and the
incompetent adult patient whose right must be asserted by a court-
appointed guardian. Conversely, any patient- competent adult, in-
competent adult, or minor-who faces an immediate emergent medical
dilemma, where minutes are of the essence, could not refuse treatment
if that refusal would result in his death. In such cases, there is not
time for the physician to consult with the patient to obtain either a
consent or denial of the treatment, and thus, the physician may
promptly administer the required medical care. Where the patient is a
minor, the model reveals that a parent or guardian must generally con-
sent to treatment. However, should the decision of the parent or
guardian not appear to be in the best interest of the child, the court
will permit the state to interfere by invoking the doctrine of parens
patriae. Moreover, the appearance of statutory controls designed to
benefit the minor patient has been evidenced in a few states.92
Traditionally, permitting the patient to die when he could be treated
was thought to be not only contrary to the physician's training and
oath to heal, but also a form of suicide. However, these attitudes are
waning. Recently, it has been determined that the doctor's interest is
not absolute and that it is equally important to recognize the in-
dividual's choice to accept or to decline medical treatment.93 In regard
to the suicide argument, two points can be made: first, the patient who
refuses treatment cannot be considered to have the requisite intent to
die, for his choice is usually prompted by legitimate reasons, such as
religious convictions; and second, if death does result from the refusal
to accept treatment, the underlying cause of death is generally a
natural one which the patient did not set into motion. In light of these
92. It must be noted that these conclusions are drawn from a variety of state and
federal court decisions and do not represent the final word since the United States
Supreme Court has yet to address the issue.
93. For example, the court in Saikewicz addressed the existing antagonism between
the ethical integrity of the medical profession and the individual's freedom of choice. The
court wrote:
Prevailing medical ethical practice does not, without exception, demand that all ef-
forts toward life prolongation be made in all circumstances. Rather, as indicated in
Quinlan, the prevailing ethical practice seems to be to recognize that the dying are
more often in need of comfort than treatment. . . . It is not necessary to deny a
right of self-determination to a patient in order to recognize the interests of doc-
tors, hospitals, and medical personnel in attendance of the patient.
370 N.E.2d at 426.
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two factors, it is suggested that the patient cannot be viewed as taking
his own life.'
Presently, a trend is beginning to emerge in the area of medical
care which reflects a concern with the quality and dignity of human
life, rather than with the notion of mere existence. In fact, this trend
can be inferred from the decisions explicated within this comment. But
because these decisions represent the views of various state and
federal jurisdictions, they lack consistency in their approach. Conse-
quently, the judiciary cannot be said to have supplied definitive
answers to the refusal of treatment question. As a remedy to this
situation, state legislatures, following the direction of California,95 can
introduce the concept of a "living will." Primarily, this type of legisla-
tion provides a legal basis for the hospital and physician to honor the
choice of the patient even if it means discontinuing treatment
necessary to avoid death. More specifically, a "living will" is a legal
instrument analogous to the concept of a revocable conditioned trust.
The patient's body is the res, the patient himself is both beneficiary
and grantor, and the doctor and hospital are trustees. The doctor is
given the authority to act in accordance with the direction of the trust
instrument as to the type of medical care to be administered." The
document is deemed effective because it is created at a time when the
patient is competent and capable of making a knowledgeable choice.
That the legislature is assuming an active role in the area of refusal of
medical treatment reflects the concern of the general public and their
desire to have the issue resolved. But whether the problems accom-
panying the medical treatment issue are judicially or legislatively re-
solved is of little consequence. It is only important that the matter be
finally decided so that as individuals, we can concern ourselves with
"the great business of life [which] is to be, to do, to do without, and to
depart."' 7
Henry Zee Shaub
94. Id. at 431 n.11
95. The California National Death Act allows competent adults to draft specific in-
structions directing the discontinuation of life sustaining treatment when death is immi-
nent in the judgment of the attending physician. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
7185-7195 (West Supp. 1977).
96. Kutner, Euthanasia: Due Process for Death with Dignity; The Living WiU, 54 IN-
DIANA L.J. 201, 226-28 (1979).
97. Address by John Morley at Edinburgh (November, 1887) (quoted in NEW DIC-
TIONARY OF QUOTATIONS ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES FROM ANCIENT AND MODERN SOURCES 693
(H.L. Mencken ed. 1977)).
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